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Dear Sirs:
The American Institute of Accountants, through its Committee
on Federal Taxation, submits herewith recommendations for revi
sion of the Federal tax laws which it believes should be considered
and acted upon at this session of Congress. The Committee believes
that there is urgent need for immediate consideration of these
matters.
Traditionally, the Committee does not concern itself with tax
rates or the rate structure. It has directed its attention to specific
provisions of the statutes, and interpretations thereof, which have
created gross inequities among taxpayers and taxpayer groups.
These inequities on occasion are the result of application of statu
tory provisions to unforeseen situations and circumstances. Some
times they are the result of faulty draftsmanship or of judicial
interpretations which seem at variance with Congressional intent,
and sometimes they result from erroneous interpretations by the
Treasury which can be rectified only by legislation.
Most of these recommendations have little budgetary signifi
cance, but a few would have a substantial effect on revenue. How
ever, in our opinion, the damage suffered from the situations to be
corrected far outweighs the apparent cost of rectifying them. In
some cases it is urged that the amendatory recommendations be made
retroactive to all open years. In other recommendations it is re
quested they be made effective only for the current and subsequent
years.
The accounting profession is becoming increasingly concerned
with variations between rules imposed upon taxpayers for the deter1
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mination of taxable income and principles developed by the account
ing profession for the business community, in many cases with the
cooperation and approval (and indeed sometimes under the man
date) of Federal and State governmental agencies. Recommenda
tions Numbers 1, 3, 4, 5, and 7 are examples presented for remedial
legislation. Controversies on accounting matters, so frequently con
cerned merely with the fiscal period for recognition of income or
deductions, have little long-range revenue significance directly,
but they impose an enormous burden on the community and on the
Treasury in time, manpower, and irritation. With the tax burden
so heavy, as it must be, such “overhead” wastes are of vital concern.
The Committee desires to emphasize that, beyond the adoption
of such technical corrections as the circumstances may indicate,
there is a fundamental need for a complete overhauling of our
Federal tax laws and a reconstruction and recodification along
simple lines, expressing a permanent policy of Federal taxation,
that would remove the necessity for continuous technical changes
which make it difficult for taxpayers, practitioners, and adminis
trators to obtain a working acquaintance with the law. Such an
objective would include simplification of language as well as of
technical structure.
Toward this end, the American Institute of Accountants has
long urged the creation of a non-partisan commission composed of
representatives of the legislative and administrative branches of
Government, and of accountants, lawyers, and representatives of
important economic groups which, free from consideration of cur
rent legislative problems, could be expected to complete a job of
this magnitude. The American Institute of Accountants continues
to urge the establishment of such a commission.
The Committee’s recommendations made herein do not cover
the whole gamut of items requiring legislative correction, but repre
sent the results of the Committee’s study and research up to the
time of this submission. Problems of revenue revision are receiv
ing the Committee’s continuous attention, and from time to time,
when further recommendations are formulated, they will be sub
mitted to the Congress.
Respectfully submitted,
Mark E. Richardson, Chairman
Committee on Federal Taxation
Thomas J. Green, Chairman
Subcommittee on Current Tax
Legislation

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Accounting for income tax purposes should be brought into closer
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles by enact
ing legislation covering at least the four matters set forth below.
[page 8]
(a) Prepaid income
Deferment of reporting of prepaid income in accordance with
generally accepted accounting principles should be authorized
in cases where such procedure is called for by the method of
accounting consistently employed by the taxpayer.
(b) Accrual of property and other taxes
Taxpayers should be permitted to deduct tax accruals, in accord
ance with generally accepted accounting principles consistently
employed by them, ratably over the period for which the taxes
are imposed.
(c) Apportionment of taxes between vendor and vendee
Property taxes should be deductible by vendor and vendee of
real property in the amounts apportioned to each in accordance
with local practice or statute.
(d) Estimated expenses and losses
Deduction should be allowed for all estimated expenses and
losses applicable, under generally accepted accounting prin
ciples, to the income of the taxable year, the reasonableness of
which can be established by the past experience of the company
or of comparable companies or businesses, or by the facts of the
situation.
2. Taxable income should not be attributed to gain on sale of a home if
the proceeds of sale are reinvested in a new home within a reason
able time after such sale, or if a new home is purchased within a
reasonable time prior to such sale with the expectation that the
proceeds are to be used for such purchase, [page 15]
3. Non-recognition of gain on involuntary conversions, provided in
Section 112(f) of the Code, should be extended to replacements
made in anticipation of the receipt of proceeds of the involuntary
conversion, [page 15]
4. The definition of “fiscal year” should be extended to include annual
accounting periods consisting of multiples of weeks instead of
months (such as 13 four-week periods, etc.). [page 16]
5. Taxpayers should be given an annual option either to capitalize or
to deduct currently expenditures for research and development,
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such option to determine the future tax treatment of such expendi
tures. [page 17]
6. Section 102 should be amended to provide [page 18]:
(a) At taxpayer’s option, dividends paid after the end of the tax
able year, but before the due date (original or extended) of the
tax return, should be allowed as a credit in computing undis
tributed Section 102 net income.
(b) In the event of imposition of surtax under Section 102, the
corporation should be permitted to relieve itself of such tax,
in whole or in part, by a deficiency dividend under conditions
and procedure now prescribed in Section 506 for personal hold
ing companies, or, alternatively, by filing consent dividend
papers, as provided in Section 28, effective as of the original
taxable year.
(c) The excess of net long-term capital gains over net short-term
capital losses should be excluded from Section 102 net income.

7. The basis of property should not be reduced by excessive deprecia
tion which resulted in no tax benefit. [page 20]
8. The limitations of Section 24(c) should not apply to deny deduction
to an accrual basis taxpayer of unpaid expenses and interest if the
person to whom the payment is made elects to include such payment
in a taxable year beginning not later than the end of the taxable
year of the payor during which the payment accrued, [page 22]

9. Where the holder of a mortgage or other debt forecloses on the
security or collateral, and himself bids in the mortgaged or pledged
property, the fair market value of the property thus bid in should be
treated as a payment on account of the debt, and the deductibility
and time of deductibility of the balance of the debt should be deter
mined under the usual rules applicable to deduction of debts worth
less in whole or in part. [page 22]

10. The right to the use of the Last-In-First-Out method of inventory
(LIFO), denied to most retailers by discriminatory and improper
interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, should be restored by appropriate legislation,
giving the right to such retailers to use the Last-In-First-Out method
of valuing inventory retroactively from January 1,1941. [page 23]
11. Section 23(k) of the Internal Revenue Code should be amended to
exclude from the definition of non-business bad debt those debts
which arise in the course of a taxpayers’ trade or business, or which
represent loans or advances to business organizations in which the

5

taxpayer has a financial interest, either as an employee, stockholder,
or creditor, [page 24]
12. The method of taxing annuities should be revised so as to treat as
income so much of each year’s annuity receipts as represents a
ratable portion of the difference between the cost of the annuity
contract and the aggregate of the annuity payments that would be
received if the annuitant lived out his life expectancy as set forth
in a standard mortality table. [page 25]

13. Partners and sole proprietors should be includible in pension and
similar plans exempt under Section 165. [page 25]
14. The provisions of the Code with respect to interest on deficiencies
and overassessments should be amended to provide for consistent
treatment between deficiencies and overassessments. [page 26]
15. Section 322 (b)(3) should be amended so as to make it clear that
the period of limitation on filing claims for refund and credit pro
vided therein is an additional period in the event that the periods
of limitation provided under Section 322 (b)(1) and (b)(2) have
expired and also to make it clear that the period of limitation under
(b) (3) does not supersede the periods of limitation under (b)(1)
and (b)(2). [page 27]
16. The basis of property, acquired by gift but subjected to estate tax
in the estate of the donor, should be the same as in the case of prop
erty passing by death and not previously made the subject of a gift.
[page 29]
17. When loss on the sale of property is disallowed by reason of the
relation of the parties, the subsequent basis of the property for
purpose of determining gain should be the transferor’s basis.
[page 30]
18. In the case of employees’ stock purchase options, there should be
treated as compensation income to the employee an amount equal
to the spread between the option price and the market value at the
time the option right becomes the property of the employee, or at
the time the employee may first exercise the option, or at the time
of exercise or sale of the option, whichever is the lesser, but in no
event should such amount exceed the proceeds of sale of the option,
if sold. Such compensation income should not be included in taxable
income until the employee sells the stock or option, provided the
option price is approximately equal to the fair market value of the
stock on the date of the option agreement, [page 50]

19. Section 122(d) (5) provides (for taxpayers other than corporations)
for allowance of losses in the computation of net operating loss
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deduction only if they are attributable to the operation of a trade
or business regularly carried on by the taxpayer. The Section should
be amended to provide for recognition in the computation of net
operating loss deduction of losses on disposal of assets used in a
trade or business by a non-corporate taxpayer. Such losses on sales
by the estate of a deceased taxpayer, and operating losses by the
estate in conducting business, should be allowed as carry-backs to
taxable years of the deceased. [page 32]

20. Recommendations with respect to personal holding companies.
[page 33]
(a) Effectuation of deficiency dividends by consent dividend proce
dure should be authorized.
(b) Deficiency dividend procedure should not be denied in cases of
non-fraudulent delinquency in filing personal holding company
tax returns.
(c) The deduction of the federal income tax, in computing undis
tributed subchapter A net income, should be clearly stated to be
the tax for the taxable year, whether the corporation is on the
cash basis or the accrual basis.
21. The present double taxation of corporate income—once to the earn
ing corporation, and again to the stockholders upon distribution of
such income as dividends—should be mitigated and eventually elim
inated. This double taxation has two aspects: (a) tax on intercor
porate dividends and (b) tax on dividends paid to non-corporate
shareholders without credit either to the corporation or to the share
holder. The tax on intercorporate dividends should be eliminated.
Non-corporate shareholders should be allowed a credit against indi
vidual income tax of a percentage of dividend income equal to the
initial combined rate of normal tax and surtax on individuals, such
credit not to exceed the tax, otherwise determined, after applying
the credits provided in Sections 31 and 32 but before applying the
credit provided in Section 35 of the Internal Revenue Code. [page 55]

22. The 2 per cent additional tax applicable to consolidated returns
should be eliminated, [page 36]
23. The "notch” provision under which corporate income between
$25,000.00 and $50,000.00 is taxed at 53 per cent as compared with
the 38 per cent applicable to income in excess of $50,000.00, should
be eliminated, and all corporate incomes, regardless of size, taxed
on a graduated rate scale up to $50,000.00 and at a flat rate there
after, the rate applicable to any income bracket to be no greater than
the flat rate, [page 36]
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24. Where a corporation is formed or availed of to acquire the assets
and become the successor, in a tax-free reorganization, of a pred
ecessor corporation, which, in pursuance of the plan, is liquidated
and dissolved, the successor corporation should step into the “tax
shoes” of the predecessor corporation for the purpose of permitting
carry-back and carry-forward of net operating losses from one to
the other, and application of the tax benefit rule to recoveries by
the successor on losses or deductions previously claimed or allow
able to the predecessor, and so as to permit full deductibility by the
successor of any payments or charges which would have been
deductible by the predecessor had the predecessor continued in
existence, {page 37]
25. For the purpose of Section 23(g) (4), which excludes from the capital
loss category, loss from worthlessness of stock in a virtually wholly
owned subsidiary of a domestic corporation, if more than 90 per
cent of the subsidiary’s gross income for its entire history was from
other than investment sources, gross income from the sale of mer
chandise, stock in trade, or property held primarily for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of the trade or business, should be
defined to mean “gross receipts” from such sales. [page 38]
26. A transfer of substantially all the assets of a corporation to another
corporation should not be disqualified as a “reorganization” under
Section 112(g)(1)(C) merely because the voting stock received in
exchange is that of a parent company of the transferee corporation.
[page 38]
27. The definition of reorganization in Section 112(g) should be broad
ened to bring within its scope “spin-off” and “split-up” transfers.
[page 39]
28. Recommendations re mitigation of effect of statute of limitations.
[page 39]
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RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Accounting for income tax purposes should be brought into closer
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles by enacting
legislation covering at least the four matters set forth below.

Ever increasing divergences between rules of accounting for
tax purposes (as prescribed by regulations, rulings, and court deci
sions), on the one hand, and generally accepted accounting prin
ciples (as universally applied in determining net income for com
mercial management and investment purposes), on the other hand,
has been and continues to be the despair of businessmen, account
ants, and tax practitioners alike. Such divergences not infre
quently result in taxing as income what is actually capital. They
are a continuous source of irritating adjustments of tax returns
which, in the long run, yield no revenue to the government, because
they merely represent shifts of income between years. The advan
tages, in terms of simplicity, of maximum conformance of tax
accounting with the accounting methods employed in the taxpay
er’s accounting records, and in the preparation of his financial and
credit reports, are self-evident.
There is no question but that it was the basic intention that
generally accepted accounting principles be applicable for tax
purposes, Thus Section 41 of the Code provides that
“The net income . . . shall be computed in accordance with
the method of accounting regularly employed in keeping the
books of such taxpayer; but ... if the method employed does
not clearly reflect the income, the computation shall be made
in accordance with such method as in the opinion of the Com
missioner does clearly reflect the income. ’ ’
The regulations (Reg. 111) provide:
“Although taxable net income is a statutory conception, it
follows, subject to certain modifications as to exemptions and
as to deductions for partial losses in some cases, the lines of
commercial usage. Subject to these modifications statutory
net income is commercial net income. This appears from the
fact that ordinarily it is to be computed in accordance with the
method of accounting regularly employed in keeping the books
of the taxpayer.” (Sec. 29.21-1)
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“If the method of accounting regularly employed by him in
keeping his books clearly reflects his income, it is to be followed
with respect to the time as of which items of gross income and
deductions are to be accounted for.” (Sec. 29.41-1)
“Approved standard methods of accounting will ordinarily
be regarded as clearly reflecting income.” (Sec. 29.41-2)
“It is recognized that no uniform method of accounting can
be prescribed for all taxpayers, and the law contemplates that
each taxpayer shall adopt such forms and systems of account
ing as are in his judgment best suited to his purpose.” (Sec.
29.41-3)

The Supreme Court, in the leading case of U. S. v. Anderson,
269 U. S. 422 (1926) in referring to the original statutory fore
runner of the above quoted excerpts from Section 41, and to an
early Treasury Decision to the same effect, stated:
“It [the Treasury Decision] recognized the right of the cor
poration to deduct all accruals and reserves without distinc
tion made on its books to meet liabilities, provided the return
included income accrued and, as made, reflected true net in
come ... It [the purpose of the statute] was to enable tax
payers to keep their books and make their returns according
to scientific accounting principles, by charging against income
earned during a taxable period, the expenses incurred in and
properly attributable to the process of earning income during
that period.”

In this statement, the Supreme Court not only succinctly and
accurately stated the primary objective of all generally accepted
accounting principles—to have each accounting period reflect the
income earned in that period and the expenses incurred in and
properly attributable to the process of earning that income—but,
what is even more important, recognized that it was the purpose
of the taxing statute to give effect to these principles, and, to that
end, to permit taxpayers “to deduct all accruals and reserves with
out distinction made on its books to meet liabilities.”
However, in the twenty-four years following the Anderson
decision, judicial interpretations of that decision and of the later
decision in North American Oil Consolidated v. Burnet, 286 U. S.
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417 (1932), have resulted in distortions of and departures from the
scientific accounting principles, recognition of which the Anderson
decision had declared to be the purpose of the taxing statute.
These distortions and divergences have occurred chiefly in the
four directions set forth below:
(a) Prepaid income:

Deferment of reporting of prepaid income in accordance with gen
erally accepted accounting principles should be authorized in cases
where such procedure is called for by the method of accounting con
sistently employed by the taxpayer.

Payments received in advance for the use of property in future
years or for services to be rendered in future years should be in
cluded as income in the future years to which applicable and not
in the year of receipt. This is well-recognized and established
accounting procedure. It is only in this way that income such as
rentals, publication subscriptions, and club dues, etc., can be clearly
reflected by including the income in the period in which it is earned
and in which are incurred the costs and expenses of earning it. In
fact, until such expenses and costs are incurred in the future
period, it cannot be known whether the advance receipts of ren
tals, etc., will represent a net income or a net loss.
However, the Courts have held that income received in advance
is nevertheless taxable in year of receipt, even where there is a con
tinuing obligation to perform services and incur expenditures over
a period of time in order to earn the income, and despite the fact
that generally accepted accounting principles, and the accounting
methods consistently employed by the taxpayer, call for the defer
ment of the reporting of such income until the period or periods in
which such income is earned by the rendering of the services and
the incurring of related expenditures. This has created all sorts of
absurd tax results, arising out of the basic difficulty that net in
come is bound to be distorted if the income is required to be included
in one period, while the related expenditures are included in a
later period.
This distortion is accentuated by the fact that, in contrast to
their treatment of income, the Courts require that expenses paid
in advance or which benefit future periods be not permitted as

11

deductions in the year of payment or accrual, but only in the future
years to which the expenses are applicable.
A striking example of such distortion occurs where a landlord,
employing the accrual method of accounting, in order to finance
the payment of the broker’s commission on a long-term lease, ar
ranges for the payment in advance of rentals applicable to the last
few years of the lease. The decisions have held that the rental thus
received in advance must be included in taxable income in the year
of receipt, whereas the broker’s commissions, which such advance
rentals were intended to finance, may not be deducted in the year
of payment, but must be spread over the life of the lease. In such
cases the result frequently is an abnormally large and unreal tax
able net income in the first year of the lease, and equally unreal
losses in the last few years of the lease—not by reason of any actual
variations in results of operations, but solely by reason of the arti
ficial accounting procedure enforced for tax purposes.
Deferment of reporting of prepaid income in accordance with
generally accepted accounting principles should be authorized in
cases where such procedure is called for by the method of account
ing consistently employed by the taxpayer.
(b) Accrual of property and other taxes:
Taxpayers should be permitted to deduct tax accruals, in accord
ance with generally accepted accounting principles consistently em
ployed by them, ratably over the period for which the taxes are
imposed.

It is universally accepted accounting practice to regard taxes
as an expense of the period for which levied. Thus if a property
tax is imposed for the calendar year 1950, it is regarded as an ex
pense of that calendar year, regardless of local peculiarities of
assessment or lien dates, and if, for example, the taxpayer should
be on a fiscal year ending May 31st, 5/12 of such tax would be in
cluded as an expense for the year ended May 31, 1950, and 7/12
would be included as an expense for the year ended May 31, 1951.
Again, if a corporation franchise tax based upon the income of a
given period should be imposed for the privilege of carrying on
business for a future period, the accepted accounting practice
would be to treat such tax as an expense of the privilege period
for which the tax is imposed.
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Under the court decisions, however, it is held that accrual of
a tax occurs upon the date when the amount and liability for the
tax become fixed and that the entire tax is deductible on, and only
on, that single date. Thus, in many jurisdictions, the amount and
liability for a property tax for the calendar year 1950 would be
fixed some time late in 1949, and, under such court decisions, would
be deductible, on the accrual basis, only at that time, whereas in
other jurisdictions, the amount and liability for the tax for 1950
would not be determined until some time in 1950 and would be
deductible only on that date. Where the income tax year of the
taxpayer varies from the property tax year of the local jurisdic
tion, many other peculiar variations ensue.
The result has been an utterly confusing pattern, in which
deductibility of taxes varies from community to community, de
pending upon the local peculiarities of assessment date, date of
issuance of assessment rolls and tax warrants, lien dates, date upon
which personal liability for the tax is determined, etc. In many
cases, several property taxes on the same property may be deduct
ible at different dates because of varying assessment and lien dates
relating to the village, county, school, and other property taxes im
posed in the community.
All of this serves no real practical purpose, since all that is
involved is a shift of deductions between years. Consistency in
practice and relation of expenses to the period for which imposed
are the important factors in clearly reflecting income. The artifi
cial rules created by the aforesaid court decisions are not even in
accord with local practice (and sometimes local statute) with
respect to the apportionment of taxes between vendor and vendee,
which is universally based on a prorating of taxes over the period
for which imposed.
These comments are not intended to cover taxes, the liability
for which is contingent, denied and contested by the taxpayer.
Taxpayers should be permitted to deduct tax accruals, in
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles consis
tently employed by them, ratably over the period for which the
taxes are imposed.
(c) Apportionment of taxes between vendor and vendee:
Property taxes should be deductible by vendor and vendee of real
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property in the amounts apportioned to each in accordance with
local practice or statute.

Local practice in all communities is to apportion property
taxes between vendor and vendee, upon a sale of real property, by
prorating the tax over the tax year for which the tax is imposed.
In some cases, such procedure is provided by local statute. Such
apportionment is made without reference to assessment dates, lien
dates, existence of personal liability for the tax, etc., but is made
wholly by reference to the tax year for which the tax is levied.
In many jurisdictions, however, a property tax for the calen
dar year 1950 would, by reason of the local statutes, have been
assessed and become a personal liability of the property owner and
a lien upon the property on or before January 1, 1950. In such
circumstances, the Supreme Court held, in Magruder v. Supplee,
316 U. S. 394 (1942), that the vendee who purchases property, for
example, after January 1, 1950—even on January 3, 1950—and,
therefore, pays practically the entire 1950 tax, cannot deduct such
tax, because it was not imposed upon him, but was a personal liabil
ity of the vendor and a lien upon his property prior to the sale.
The vendee, says the Court, is not permitted the deduction because
the tax payment by him merely discharges an existing lien upon
the property and is therefore a part of his cost. At the same time,
however, the vendor may not deduct the tax because he did not
pay it.
This is not only an artificial and distorted result, but does com
plete violence to real estate practice which has been in existence
long before the income tax came on to the statute books.
The statute should be amended to provide for deduction of
property taxes by vendor and vendee in accordance with the
amounts thereof apportioned to each, if such apportionment is
pursuant to local practice or statute in that respect.
(d) Estimated expenses and losses:
Deduction should be allowed for all estimated expenses and losses
applicable, under generally accepted accounting principles, to the
income of the taxable year, the reasonableness of which can be
established by the past experience of the company or of comparable
companies or businesses, or by the facts of the situation.

In applying the basic principle of accounting for income,
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namely, that of including expenses and losses in the period in which
is earned the income to which they relate, it is generally accepted
practice to provide by estimates for expenses and losses relating
to the accounting period and which are reasonably determinable
in amount. Such estimates, at least to the extent that experience
and surrounding circumstances establish their reasonableness,
should be allowed as deductions.
Thus, where accounts receivable are outstanding at the end of
a period, it is accepted accounting practice to deduct the estimated
loss for the cash discounts which, experience has shown, will be
taken by the customers on payment. It has been held, however,
that such a loss may not be deducted, because, until the customers
actually pay the accounts, it is not known which customers will, and
which will not, pay in time to be entitled to the discount—this,
despite the fact that experience over a period of years may estab
lish that, with comparatively little variance, a determinable per
centage of the customers takes advantage of the discounts. Again,
if merchandise is sold under a guarantee, or with an agreement to
service or repair the product for a given period, past experience
frequently indicates the amount of future repair and service ex
pense, or losses on guarantees on such sales, with a high degree of
accuracy, and proper accounting procedure would require that
estimates for such future expenses and losses arising out of such
sales should be deducted in determining the income realized there
from. Nevertheless, for the same reasons as in the case of the cash
discounts, such items are not allowed, and deduction therefor is
not permitted until the period or periods in which the losses are
sustained or the repair and service expenses incurred. Under these
conditions, the taxpayer is always being subjected to tax on an
amount of income, which, in fact, is not income, but capital.
Deduction of such losses is at present permitted by statute in
the case of bad debts. The basis of such statutory authorization
was generally accepted accounting practice.
This principle should he extended to estimates for all expenses
and losses applicable, under generally accepted accounting prin
ciples, to the income of the taxable year, the reasonableness of which
can be established by the past experience of the company or of com
parable companies or businesses, or by the facts of the situation.
This recommendation is not intended to be applicable to “Re
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serves” as employed by special classes of taxpayers like insurance
companies, nor is it intended to cover provisions for unrealized
decrease in value of property, for contingencies, or for items the
liability for which is contested by the taxpayer.
2. Taxable income should not be attributed to gain on sale of a home if
the proceeds of sale are reinvested in a new home within a reasonable
time after such sale, or if a new home is purchased within a reasonable
time prior to such sale with the expectation that the proceeds are to be
used for such purchase.

Section 112 of the Internal Revenue Code provides that if
property held for productive use or investment is exchanged for
property of a like kind held either for productive use in trade or
business or for investment, no gain or loss shall be recognized.
No gain is recognized in excess of the amount of money or other
property received in exchange.
If an individual sells a home, because he is required to move
to a new location or for some other reason, he cannot deduct any
loss realized and further he must pay tax on gain realized regard
less of the fact that he reinvests all of the proceeds of sale in a
new home.
Section 112 should be amended to provide that no gain or loss
shall be recognized if proceeds of sale of a home are invested in
another home within a period six months prior to or subsequent to
the date of sale, except to the extent that such proceeds exceed
the amount invested in the new home. The provisions of Section
113(a) (6) should be made applicable to determination of the basis
for determining gain on sale of a home acquired under circum
stances described above.
3. Non-recognition of gain on involuntary conversions, provided in Sec
tion 112(f) of the Code, should be extended to replacements made in
anticipation of the receipt of proceeds of the involuntary conversion.

Under Section 112(f), if property is involuntarily converted
into money, as by fire and receipt of insurance proceeds, or by con
demnation and receipt of condemnation award, no gain is recog
nized, even if the proceeds exceed the adjusted basis of the prop
erty, if the proceeds are used forthwith to replace the property with
other property similar or related in service or use, or in the estab
lishment of a replacement fund for that purpose. However, under
the court decisions, this applies only if the particular moneys
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received as proceeds of the involuntary conversion are expended in
the acquisition of such similar property or in the establishment of
a replacement fund. In many cases, months and sometimes years
elapse between the time of the destruction or condemnation of the
property and the receipt of the insurance proceeds or condemnation
award. If, in anticipation of the receipt of such proceeds, the tax
payer should spend an equivalent or greater amount in the acquisi
tion of similar property, out of its own or funds borrowed for the
purpose (to be replaced or repaid out of the conversion proceeds)
the court decisions hold that the non-recognition provisions of Sec
tion 112(f) do not apply. This defeats the underlying purpose of
Section 112(f), since in most cases it is utterly impractical for the
taxpayer to wait, and perhaps to suspend business operations, until
the conversion proceeds are received.
Accordingly, this section should be amended to make it clear
that replacements within the purview of the statute are governed by
its provisions, even if made in anticipation of the receipt of the
conversion proceeds. This amendment should be made applicable
retroactively to all open years.
4. The definition of “fiscal year” should be extended to include annual
accounting periods consisting of multiples of weeks instead of months
(such as 13 four-week periods, etc.).

Use of four and five-week periods rather than monthly ac
counting periods has been consistently followed by many trades
and industries in an effort to make more accurate cost distribu
tions, and financial comparisons, which would otherwise be dis
turbed by use of months that vary from 28 to 31 days. It has been
the only possible method of accurately reflecting costs in many in
dustries and businesses. In certain businesses, such as meats, gro
ceries and other retail stores, the packing industry, the baking in
dustry, and others, merchandising is handled on a weekly basis,
making weekly closing of accounts the only practicable procedure.
A natural corollary of this method of accounting is for annual
accounting on a thirteen four-week period basis, or by using twelve
periods of which eight are four weeks in length, and four are five
weeks in length. Under this procedure, determination of the end
of the week, or the end of the year, is simply a matter of selecting
the most practical day for closing. In most businesses, it is Saturday
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night of the fourth week. In others, it may be a Monday night, etc.
In these cases, an additional week is included in the annual period
every five or six years in order to compensate for the difference
between an actual year and 52 weeks. Such use of accountingperiods, consisting of multiples of weeks, is a common and gener
ally accepted business and accounting practice.
Prior to the decision in the case of Parks-Chambers, Inc. (131
Fed. (2) 65, affirming 46 B.T.A. 114), it had been understood that
the Bureau approved this practice, provided it clearly reflected in
come and was adopted in conformity with good business practice.
Under said decision, use of the thirteen four-week period (or the
indicated alternatives) is barred for tax reporting purposes. Use
of such periods was held to mean that the taxpayer had not elected
a fiscal year, because the selected period did not end on the last
day of a month, with the result that, unless the thirteen four-week
period just happened to end on the last day of a month, the calendar
year must be used for tax purposes in utter disregard of the tax
payer’s actual annual accounting period.
Such methods of accounting by which 52 consecutive weeks
(and occasionally 53 weeks) are represented in each fiscal year
should be approved. There is no practical reason to the contrary.
It is a serious problem for long established businesses, whose ac
counting methods have been repeatedly approved in Bureau exami
nations, to have to alter methods of keeping books, reports to stock
holders and credit agencies, cost accounting systems and other
extremely detailed record-keeping processes.
The law should be amended retroactively to include within the
definition of “fiscal year” any annual period consistently employed
by the taxpayer, if the taxpayer uses the system of dividing its
annual accounting period into four-week periods or four and fiveweek periods, instead of calendar months.
5. Taxpayers should be given an annual option either to capitalize or to
deduct currently expenditures for research and development, such op
tion to determine the future tax treatment of such expenditures.

In general, a taxpayer is allowed to deduct ordinary and neces
sary expenses but not expenditures for improvements or better
ments. Most taxpayers charge off all research and development
expenditures against income as they are incurred. Some taxpayers,
however, capitalize major expenditures for such purposes and
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amortize the expenditures over a specified period, usually arbi
trarily determined.
The Commissioner has often disallowed many of these expen
ditures, treating them as capital expenditures, and the contro
versy between taxpayer and Commissioner has to be settled by com
promise because the attitude of the courts in such situations is un
certain. Where the expenditure is capitalized by the taxpayer,
whether voluntarily or involuntarily, the problem arises as to the
period over which the capitalized items should be amortized or
written off against income. The adoption of an established policy
as to the treatment of research and development expenditures
would be in the public interest.
Accordingly, it is recommended that Section 24(a) (2) be
amended to provide that a taxpayer shall have the option either to
capitalize or to deduct when incurred as an ordinary and necessary
expense any expenditures for research and development except
for a capital expenditure for tangible property. A separate option
should exist for each year’s expenditures or for each research or
development project, but once the option is exercised for any year’s
expenditures or project it should be final. Where such expendi
tures or projects are capitalized, the rate of amortization should
be determined by the taxpayer, but once fixed as to a particular
year’s expenditure it should be final for the year of expenditure
and for future years unless the project is disposed of or abandoned.
Any capital expenditures incurred as a result of research and
development of tangible property should be capitalized but in an
amount not to increase the tax basis of such property above its fair
replacement value or fair market value, whichever is lower. Where
the property is subject to wear and tear, etc., such expenditures
should be recoverable through ordinary depreciation rates under
Section 23(1).
If a research or development project, or if resulting tangible
property is disposed of or abandoned in a future year, the profit or
loss on such disposal or abandonment should be treated in accord
ance with Section 117(j).
6. Section 102 should be amended to provide:

(a) At taxpayer’s option dividends paid after the end of the tax
able year, but before the due date (original or extended) of the
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tax return, should be allowed as a credit in computing undis
tributed Section 102 net income.
(b) In the event of imposition of surtax under Secton 102, the cor
poration should be permitted to relieve itself of such tax, in
whole or in part, by a deficiency dividend under conditions and
procedure now prescribed in Section 506 for personal holding
companies, or, alternatively, by filing consent dividend papers,
as provided in Section 28, effective as of the original taxable
year.

(c) The excess of net long-term capital gains over net short-term
capital losses should be excluded from Section 102 net income.

High corporate profits during the postwar period combined
with high individual tax rates have unquestionably created some
situations to which Section 102 should be applied. These are cases
in which the accumulation of earnings in the corporation is clearly
beyond all reasonable needs of the business and is motivated by a
purpose to save taxes to the shareholders.
In many other cases, however, corporations with a temporary,
highly abnormal liquidity find themselves under powerful silent
pressure from Section 102 to pay dividends when considerations
of normal business prudence would require conservation of these
funds for additions to and replacements of facilities, expansion,
protection against possible business decline, or other valid pur
poses. With the return of competitive business conditions, the need
for greater working capital is more evident (with prices far above
prewar levels, inventories and receivables reflect dollar amounts
far larger than prewar amounts, even for the same physical vol
ume). The increasing tendency reflected in some court decisions to
restrict justification for retention of earnings to business require
ments which are imminent and definite, as well as the fact that the
burden of justification of retaining earnings is on the taxpayer,
exerts pressure toward unsound dividend policy. Directors, acting
in good faith and using their best judgment, may find their judg
ment held to be erroneous by the Commissioner or by the courts
(who have the benefit of hindsight) and thus be exposed to minority
stockholders’ actions.
This pressure and the uncertainty which it creates in the for
mulation of sound business policy is the most unfortunate feature
of the present situation.
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Under our present system of taxing dividends, the principle of
Section 102 is undoubtedly necessary. It would appear that assur
ance of a wise and sympathetic administration of the Section is
equally necessary. Announcement of an administrative policy to
apply Section 102 only in clearly flagrant cases, or where dividend
history over a number of years clearly indicates tax-motivated non
distribution of earnings, and that the taxpayer would receive the
benefit of any reasonable doubt, might help considerably to relieve
existing confusion and uncertainty.
Nevertheless, if the burden of proof is to remain on the tax
payer and not be shifted to the Commissioner, then the taxpayer
should be permitted to relieve itself of the imposition of the tax,
in whole or in part, by the methods recommended. In that manner,
the taxpayer would be permitted to take advantage of the same
hindsight which is now available to the Commissioner and the
courts.
Likewise, the application of the Section 102 surtax to long
term capital gains is inequitable. Such income, when realized by a
corporation, is taxed at the same maximum rate at which it would
be taxed if realized directly by an individual. Thus, the income does
not escape its proper tax burden by reason of being realized and
accumulated by a corporation rather than by an individual. Since
under existing law net long-term capital gains are not subject to
the tax on undistributed net income imposed on personal holding
companies, ordinary corporations should not be subjected to a
greater burden. Finally, the Section should be amended so as not
to apply to corporations whose stock ownership is broader than that
stated in Section 501 relating to personal holding companies.
7. The basis of property should not be reduced by excessive depreciation
which resulted in no tax benefit.

The requirement that excessive depreciation previously allowed
be deducted in determining the basis of assets was included in the
statute in order to prevent a taxpayer from obtaining a double de
duction, with double tax benefit, of the same capital investment.
However, that rule should not be applied if the excessive deprecia
tion has resulted in no tax benefit. The reason for avoiding the
inequitable result that formerly arose from the taxation of recover
ies of bad debts and taxes, where no tax benefit had been obtained
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from the original deduction, is equally applicable to excessive
depreciation.
Section 113(b) (1) (B) of the Internal Revenue Code provides
that, in determining the basis of property, “proper adjustment in
respect of the property shall in all cases be made ... in respect
of any period since February 28, 1913, for exhaustion, wear and
tear, obsolescence, amortization, and depletion, to the extent
allowed (but not less than the amount allowable) under this chap
ter or prior income tax laws ...”
From the Bureau’s own instructions it appears that “where it
is clearly evident that no taxable income will be developed,” the
Bureau does not even attempt to judge whether the depreciation de
ducted by taxpayers in loss years is properly allowable, but simply
postpones examinations until years which show profits. Yet, when
the Bureau eventually finds that the depreciation deductions taken
were improper and excessive, it contends that its own failure to
examine a “loss return” at the proper time constitutes an “allow
ance” and approval of such improper and excessive deductions
taken by the taxpayer.
The legislative history of Section 113(b)(1)(B) clearly dis
closes that Congress introduced the distinction between “allow
able” and “allowed” without any thought of changing the law in
force prior to 1932, being intent solely upon codifying the already
well-established equitable principle of estoppel. (See Sen. Rep.
665, p. 29, 72nd Congress, 1st Session; H. R. Rep. 708, p. 22, 72nd
Congress, 1st Session). However, where a past error had no con
sequences at the time when it was committed, no inequity can
have arisen, which would call for the application of any principle
of estoppel. Where no tax would have been due even if the re
turn had been correct, the Commissioner cannot obviously have
“allowed” something merely by doing nothing.
Since the Bureau’s position has been supported by a five-tofour Supreme Court decision in Virginian Hotel Corporation of
Lynchburg v. Guy T. Helvering, Commissioner of Internal Rev
enue (63 S. Ct. 1260), only remedial legislation can effectively
correct the situation. Such legislation should provide that the ad
justment for depreciation theretofore “allowed” should be for only
such part of the depreciation deductions as reduced taxes other
wise payable.
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8. The limitations of Section 24(c) should not apply to deny deduction to
an accrual basis taxpayer of unpaid expenses and interest if the person
to whom the payment is made elects to include such payment in a taxable
year beginning not later than the end of the taxable year of the payor
during which the payment accrued.

Section 24(c) disallows to a taxpayer on the accrual basis all
deductions for unpaid expenses and interest which are payable to
related interests who are on a cash basis unless the payment is
made during the taxpayer’s taxable year or within two and onehalf months after the close of such year. The purpose of this Sec
tion is to prevent a taxpayer claiming a deduction for expenses
or interest payable to a related interest where the latter is not re
quired to include the items as income.
It has been held in a number of cases that the deduction was
not allowable even though the related interest, on a cash basis, was
required to include the expenses as income because “constructively
received.”
Section 24(c), should be amended to provide that such section
shall not apply where the person to whom the payment is made
elects to include such payment in his return for a taxable year be
ginning not later than the end of the taxable year within which
the payor’s taxable year ends. This would be analogous to the
consent dividend provision in Section 28.
9. Where the holder of a mortgage or other debt forecloses on the security
or collateral, and himself bids in the mortgaged or pledged property,
the fair market value of the property thus bid in should be treated as
a payment on account of the debt, and the deductibility and time of
deductibility of the balance of the debt should be determined under the
usual rules applicable to deduction of debts worthless in whole or in part.

Under present Bureau regulations where a debtor bids in
mortgaged or pledged property, the transaction is split into two
elements: (1) the portion of the debt which was applied to the satis
faction of the bid price is compared with the fair market value of
the property, with resulting gain or loss—sometimes claimed to be
capital gain or loss (in one case where not only principal, but also
interest on the debt, was applied towards satisfaction of the bid
price, the Supreme Court held that interest income resulted);
(2) the deductibility of the balance of the debt, not applied to the
bid price, is determined under the usual rules relating to debts
worthless in whole or in part, depending upon whether there is en
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forceable personal liability, other collateral, guarantees, etc. Par
ticularly where it is claimed that the first element results in capital
gain or loss, distorted results frequently ensue.
Actually all that has happened is that the debtor has received
as against his investment in the debt, property having a certain fair
market value, leaving the balance of the investment in the debt to
be recouped. If worthless, this balance should be allowed as an
ordinary bad debt deduction and should not be split artificially
into two parts, according to the accident of the bid price, which,
usually because of absence of competing bidders, frequently fails
entirely to reflect true values or the realities of the situation.
10. The right to the use of the Last-In-First-Out method of inventory
(LIFO), denied to most retailers by discriminatory and improper inter
pretation of the Internal Revenue Code by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, should be restored by appropriate legislation, giving the right
to such retailers to use the Last-In-First-Out method of valuing inven
tory retroactively from January 1, 1941.

Remedial legislation is necessary to correct a discrimination
against a large segment of American retail industry which has
persisted since 1941. This injustice has resulted from an improper
and discriminatory interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code by
the Bureau of Internal Revenue respecting the right of retailers to
the use of the Last-In-First-Out method of valuing inventory pro
vided by Section 22(d) of the Code.
The Hutzler Brothers Company decision of the Tax Court,
handed down early in 1947, invalidated the Bureau’s erroneous
interpretation, but under regulations presently in effect, only those
retailers who acted in contravention of the position of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue and contested such Bureau position are en
titled to the elective method provided by Congress and confirmed
by the Hutzler decision. Those retailers who obeyed the inter
pretation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue have therefore been
penalized.
The Bureau has recently denied relief to these taxpayers by an
assertion that it (the Bureau) could not remedy this discrimina
tion by administrative action. The Treasury has stated, “It has
been concluded accordingly that no revision of the regulations . . .
will be undertaken by the Department so long as the statutory pro
visions involved are retained in their present form.”
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While retailers have been permitted, by reason of the revision
of the Bureau’s regulations in 1948, to adopt the LIFO method
from the year 1947 forward, the large group of retailers who were
misled by the Bureau’s original erroneous position are not now per
mitted to adopt the LIFO method retroactively to 1941 although all
other types of taxpayers were permitted for the years 1941 through
1946, inclusive, the use of the LIFO method.
Since the Bureau has now admitted the validity of the appli
cation of the LIFO method to retail taxpayers, and has denied the
right to retailers to use the LIFO method retroactively to 1941
only because such taxpayers did not meet the statutory require
ment pertaining to the reports to shareholders and creditors, and
because such taxpayers did not meet the Bureau’s regulatory re
quirements governing time and manner of election of method, such
discrimination must be eliminated by giving to the discriminatedagainst retailers the right to use the LIFO method retroactively
to January 1,1941. If Section 22(d) had been fairly and properly
interpreted by the Bureau in 1941, the discrimination against re
tailers would not have taken place. To treat all taxpayers fairly,
legislation should retroactively provide for LIFO for retailers to
January 1,1941.
11. Section 23(k) of the Internal Revenue Code should be amended to ex
clude from the definition of non-business bad debt those debts which
arise in the course of a taxpayer’s trade or business, or which represent
loans or advances to business organizations in which the taxpayer has
a financial interest either as an employee, stockholder, or creditor.

The present statutory definition of non-business bad debt has
been interpreted by the Treasury Department to exclude those
debts which arose in the course of a trade or business but which at
the time of worthlessness are not directly connected with a trade
or business of the taxpayer suffering the loss. Classification on the
basis of circumstances when the debt was incurred would be a more
equitable test.
Furthermore, considerable controversy and litigation has en
sued as to the classification of bad debts incurred by employees and
investors on loans and advances to business organizations by which
they are employed or in which they have a financial interest. The
present attitude of the Treasury Department puts a premium on
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form rather than on substance, and inhibits necessary flexibility
of business dealings.
The first part of the proposed amendment should be effective
for debts becoming worthless after December 31, 1949, and the
second part should be effective for all open years.
12. The method of taxing annuities should be revised so as to treat as income
so much of each year’s annuity receipts as represents a ratable portion
of the difference between the cost of the annuity contract and the
aggregate of the annuity payments that would be received if the
annuitant lived out his life expectancy as set forth in a standard mor
tality table.

Under Section 22(b)(2), I.R.C., the taxpayer receiving an
annuity is taxed on an amount equal to 3 per cent of the cost, the
remainder being treated as a recovery of capital. Under this
method of taxing annuities, the chance of recovering capital taxfree during the lifetime of a taxpayer is remote, particularly since
most annuity contracts now in existence are based upon a lower
interest yield than 3 per cent.
Section 22(b) (2), I.R.C., should be amended to provide that
the principal of the annuity payments shall be computed by spread
ing the cost of the annuity over the life expectancy beginning with
the commencement of annuity payments and only that portion of
each annuity payment which is in excess of that applicable to prin
cipal shall be included in gross income.
13. Partners and sole proprietors should be includible in pension and similar
plans exempt under Section 165.

Stockholder-employees, even when they are major or sole
stockholders, can be included, subject to certain limitations, in
pension plans qualifying under Section 165, contributions to which
are currently deductible by the corporation, with no taxability to
the participants in the plan until benefits are received. Subject
to the same limitations, where the business is conducted as a part
nership or proprietorship, the partners or proprietor should be
eligible for inclusion in such plans. Under present law, a qualified
plan must be for the exclusive benefit of employees, which includes
stockholder-employees, but not partners or proprietors, since the
latter are not employees. The statute should be amended to admit
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partners and proprietors to participation in plans qualifying under
Section 165.
14. The provisions of the code with respect to interests on deficiencies and
overassessments should be amended to provide for consistent treatment
between deficiencies and overassessments.

The provisions of the Internal Revenue Code dealing with the
allowance of interest on overassessments (refunds) contained in
Section 3771 provide a general rule that interest on overpayments
(overassessments) shall be allowed at the rate of 6 per cent:
(a) In the case of a credit; from the date of the overpayment
to the due date of the amount against which the credit is
taken, but if the amount against which the credit is taken
is an additional assessment, then to the date of the assess
ment of that amount.
(b) In the case of a refund; from the date of the overpayment
to a date preceding the date of the refund check by not
more than thirty days, such date to be determined by the
Commissioner.
Although the income tax and the excess profits tax on corpora
tions are correlative taxes computed for all practical purposes as a
unit, they are as a general rule treated as independent taxes for the
purpose of interest computations. As a result, the interest charge
on a net deficiency of two related taxes is greater than the interest
charge on a deficiency of the same amount in a single tax.
This inequity is illustrated by the following common example.
Whenever there is an increase in excess profits tax with a corre
sponding reduction in income tax or an increase in income tax with
a corresponding reduction in excess profits tax and the original
tax in each instance had been paid in quarterly installments, in
terest adjustments are made as follows:
(a) Upon the deficiency, interest is computed from the date
the original return was due, namely on the fifteenth day
of the third month following the close of the calendar or
fiscal year.
(b) On the other hand, interest on the overassessment is com
puted from the time the tax was overpaid. If the entire
overpayment is applicable to the last installment (Blair
v. Birkenstock, 271 U.S. 348; C.B. V-1, 142), interest is
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computed from the fifteenth day of the twelfth month fol
lowing the close of the calendar or fiscal year. The tax
payer, under the circumstances, is overcharged to the ex
tent of nine months’ interest on the refund, purely on the
basis of theoretical, if not arbitrary, bookkeeping.
In cases involving the filing of Form 874, interest should cease
on the net deficiency—the excess of the deficiency over the over
assessment—thirty days from the signing of the waiver and accept
ance form. If it is necessary to file a revised form 874 with an in
crease in the net deficiency, interest should accumulate only on the
increase in the net deficiency. It should be unnecessary to file sep
arate waiver or acceptance forms in respect to the deficiency and
in respect to the overassessment. Although income taxes and ex
cess profits taxes appear in separate chapters of the Internal Rev
enue Code, they should be "deemed” a single tax for interest pur
poses.
Legislation is required to clarify the conflict resulting from
the Treasury’s interpretation of Section 3771(b)(1) and 292(a)
where Form 874 is executed.
To prevent any abuse resulting from a long delay in tendering
a refund check to the taxpayer, Section 3771(b)(2) should be
amended so as to provide that if the Commissioner does not tender
a check to the taxpayer within thirty days after the date of such
check additional interest shall be allowed and paid.
15. Section 322 (b)(3) should be amended so as to make it clear that the
period of limitation on filing claims for refund and credit provided
therein is an additional period in the event that the periods of limitation
provided under Section 322 (b)(1) and (b)(2) have expired and also to
make it clear that the period of limitation under (b)(3) does not super
sede the periods of limitation under (b)(1) and (b)(2).

Subparagraph (b)(3) was added to Section 322 of the In
ternal Revenue Code by Section 169(a) of the Revenue Act of
1942, applicable to taxable years beginning after December 31,
1941. The reports of the House Committee on Ways and Means
and the Senate Finance Committee, in explaining the purpose and
effect of Paragraph (b) (3), say that “subsection (a) of this Sec
tion of the Bill adds paragraph 3 to Section 322(b) to give the
taxpayer the right to file a claim for credit or refund during the
extended period and during six months thereafter, in case an over
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payment is discovered after the time for obtaining credit or refund
of such overpayment under the provisions of Section 322(b)(1)
and (2).” Paragraph (b)(3) as drafted and as it now appears
in the Code provides that where a waiver under Section 276(b) has
been given by a taxpayer, i.e., where an agreement is entered into
between the Commissioner and a taxpayer to extend the period of
limitation on assessment of a deficiency, the period of limitation
on a claim for credit or refund expires within six months after the
expiration of the extended period of limitation on assessment. This
provision has been construed by the Bureau to supersede, in the
case of a waiver, the periods of limitation provided in Paragraphs
(b)(1) and (2). Such a construction is unquestionably contrary
to the intent of Congress as stated in the Committee reports. The
effect of such a construction can be and often has been so grossly
inequitable as to be clearly illogical.
As an illustration of the inequity of the effect of Paragraph
(b) (3) as construed and applied by the Bureau, consider the status
of claims for refund filed by taxpayers A and B under the respec
tive circumstances described below:
A
March 15,1946
March 1,1949

March 30,1949
March 15,1949
June 1,1949
June 30,1949
January 3,1950

History of Cases
Return for 1945 filed
Waiver under Sec. 276(b) filed, ex
tending limitation on assessment
until 6/30/49
Assessment made
Regular period of limitation on as
sessment expired
Additional tax assessed
Additional tax paid
Claim for refund filed

B
March 15,1946
None

March 15,1949
March 15,1949

June 1,1949
June 30,1949
June 30,1951

The Bureau would regard A’s claim as filed too late because
it was filed more than six months after the expiration of the waiver
period, but would regard B’s claim as timely filed, because it was
filed within two years after payment of the tax, although A coop
erated with the Bureau by extending the period of assessment and
although the taxes were both assessed and paid on the same date.
Such peculiar and inequitable results were certainly not con
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templated by Congress; just as certainly such results are contrary
to the intent of Congress.
Paragraph (b) (3) should be amended so as to leave no room
for doubt that it grants an additional extension of the period of
limitation for filing claims for credit or refund if the periods of
limitation under Paragraphs (b)(1) and (2) have expired; in
other words, that the period of limitation on filing claims for
credit or refund is the period under Paragraphs (b) (1) and (2)
or the period of six months after the expiration of the waiver
period, whichever is later. The amendment should be made retro
active to taxable years beginning after December 31,1941, so as to
make such retroactive effect contemporaneous with the effective
date of Paragraph (b) (3) as originally added to the Internal
Revenue Code.
It is significant that by Section 509(a) of the Revenue Act of
1943, Congress granted an additional period of six months after
the expiration of a waiver for taxable years as far back as years
beginning after December 31,1923, in instances where a tax could
be assessed only by reason of a waiver. This means that a taxpayer
who had given a series of waivers of limitation on assessment for
1924 until June 30, 1949 could file a timely claim for refund of a
tax on or before December 31, 1949, although the tax was paid in
1925, while another taxpayer who had given a similar series of
waivers but who paid an additional tax for 1924 on June 30, 1949,
would also have to file a claim therefor within six months after
payment. In the attempt to recognize the equities of the first tax
payer’s position, Congress has unintentionally been inequitable to
the other taxpayer.
16. The basis of property, acquired by gift but subjected to estate tax in the
estate of the donor, should be the same as in the case of property passing
by death and not previously made the subject of a gift.

In many cases all or some portion of property held by the
decedent as a joint tenant or tenant by the entirety, and property
previously transferred by the decedent by gift or in trust, is re
quired to be included in the estate of the decedent for estate tax
purposes.
If property is treated, for estate tax purposes, as though it
had passed on death, the basis thereof for income tax purposes
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should be the same as if it had passed on death, namely, the value
at which subjected to estate tax. Under present law, though sub
jected to estate tax, the property’s basis for income tax purposes
remains the frequently lower cost to the decedent-donor, so that
upon a sale of the property at the estate tax valuation, there is also
an income tax to be paid.
17. When loss on the sale of property is disallowed by reason of the relation
of the parties, the subsequent basis of the property for purpose of
determining gain should be the tranferor’s basis.

Section 24 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code provides that, in
computing net income, no deduction shall be allowed in respect of
losses from sales or exchanges of property directly or indirectly,
(a) between members of a family; (b) between an individual and
a corporation in which he owns (actually or constructively) more
than fifty per cent of the outstanding stock; (c) between two cor
porations when more than fifty per cent of the outstanding stock
of each is owned by or for the same individual; and, in the case of
trusts, between (d) grantor and fiduciary, (e) beneficiary and
fiduciary of trusts, or (f) trusts themselves, if created by the same
grantor.
Under present law, if the purchaser in such a transaction
thereafter sells at a price higher than he paid, though less than
the transferor’s cost, taxable gain results. This offends the general
principle, applied in many other sections of the Code, that trans
actions resulting in no recognized gain or loss shall not affect the
tax basis of the property.
The Code should be amended to provide that the rule appli
cable to gifts be applied to such properties and that, for the pur
pose of determining gain, the cost or other basis of the transferor
be the basis to the transferee, but for the purpose of determining
losses the basis be limited to the value at the date of transfer. The
amendment should also provide that the holding period under sec
tion 117 of the Code, in case of gain, shall include the holding
period of the transferor.
18. In the case of employees’ stock purchase options, there should be treated
as compensation income to the employee an amount equal to the spread
between the option price and the market value at the time the option
right becomes the property of the employee or at the time the employee
may first exercise the option, or at the time of exercise or sale of the
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option, whichever is the lesser, but in no event should such amount ex
ceed the proceeds of sale of the option, if sold. Such compensation in
come should not be included in taxable income until the employee sells
the stock or option, provided the option price is approximately equal to
the fair market value of the stock on the date of the option agreement.

The practice of granting to officers and other employees op
tions to purchase or subscribe for shares of stock in the employer
corporation has frequently been used as an incentive. Such em
ployee participation in ownership, with a resulting more direct
interest in the success of the corporation, should be encouraged.
The rule applied under existing regulations
“is that an employee exercising an option to purchase stock
from his employer corporation receives taxable income at the
time the option is exercised to the extent of the difference
between the market value of the stock at the time of exercise
and the option (or purchase) price. The difference is taxed
as ordinary income, rather than as a capital gain, on the theory
that it represents additional compensation to the employee.
Since the employee does not realize cash income at the time
the option is exercised, the imposition of a tax at that time
often works a real hardship. An immediate sale of a portion
of the stock acquired under the option may be necessary in
order to finance the payment of the tax. This, of course, re
duces the effectiveness of the employee stock option as an in
centive device.” (See H. R. Rep. 2087, p. 4, 80th Congress, 2nd
Session.)
There should not be taxed to the employee as compensation
income more than the amount which is actually realized by the
employee and is attributable to the benefit given to the employee
by the option. Accordingly, the compensation income should be
limited to the difference between the option or purchase price and
the market value of the stock at the time the option right becomes
the property of the employee (which date is frequently later than
the date of the option agreement). Furthermore, such compensa
tion income should not exceed the difference between the option
or purchase price and the market value of the stock at the time the
option is exercised, and, in no event, should it exceed the proceeds
from the sale of the option, if sold. Any subsequent increase in
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value of the option or of the stock should be treated, upon ultimate
disposition of the option or the stock, as a capital gain. The basis
for the option should be the amount determined to be compensation
income.
In order to induce the employee to retain his stake in the busi
ness for a substantial interval, the portion of the gain which is to
be treated as compensation income should not be taxed until the
ultimate realization of the income by sale of the stock or the option.
If the employee dies before the stock or option is sold, then,
under Section 126 of the Code, upon later sale of the stock or option
by the estate or heir, the seller would be subject to tax upon the
compensation element to the same extent as if the sale had been
made by the decedent. If during his lifetime the employee makes
a gift of the stock or the option, the compensation element should
be taxed to the employee to the same extent as if he had made a
sale.
In order to prevent abuse, the amendments should apply only
to cases where the option price is not less than, say, 25 per cent
below the fair market value of the stock on the date of the option
agreement. If the option price is more than 25 per cent below such
fair market value, the entire spread should be included in taxable
income on the date of the option agreement.
The deduction allowable to the employer corporation for the
compensation element should not be postponed beyond the date
that the option right becomes the property of the employee. The
principle of deferring the taxability of income to the employee,
while permitting the deduction of compensation to the employer
corporation, is not inconsistent with other provisions of the Code
relating to deferred compensation.
19. Section 122(d)(5) provides (for taxpayers other than corporations) for
allowance of losses in the computation of net operating loss deduction
only if they are attributable to the operation of a trade or business regu
larly carried on by the taxpayer. The Section should be amended to pro
vide for recognition in the computation of net operating loss deduction
of losses on disposal of assets used in a trade or business by a non
corporate taxpayer. Such losses on sales by the estate of a deceased tax
payer, and operating losses by the estate in conducting business, should
be allowed as carry-backs to taxable years of the deceased.

In IT 3711 the Treasury Department ruled on the matter of
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computation of net operating loss deduction of an individual tax
payer who sold at a loss several parcels of real estate operated by
her as a source of income. The Department held that such losses
were deductible in full by the taxpayer as ordinary losses since the
assets constituted property used in trade or business. However it
held that the losses were not includible in computation of net oper
ating loss deduction (except to the extent of non-business gross
income) on the grounds that while the taxpayer was in the business
of operating real estate, she was not in the business of selling real
estate. The courts have taken the same position on several occa
sions.
It seems reasonable to maintain that operating a business
comprehends purchasing and selling the related assets, and that
losses on sale of such assets are business losses, even if all of the
assets are sold and the taxpayer ceases to conduct business. Such
losses are presently allowable in determining net operating loss for
corporate taxpayers. Section 122(d)(5) should be amended by
striking out the words "the operation of” so that the section
would not apply to any deduction attributable to a trade or business
regularly carried on by the taxpayer.
Section 122 should also be amended to allow a net operating
loss deduction on operation and sale of assets by the estate of a
deceased taxpayer, to be a carry-back to taxable years of the de
ceased for the period provided for by the Section.
These amendments should be effective retroactively for all open
years.
In support of the asserted position, it should be noted that the
report of the Committee on Ways and Means, in amplification of
the non-business bad debt provision of the 1942 Act, stated that
‘‘a loss incurred in liquidating a business is a proximate incident
to the conduct of a business.”
20. Recommendations with respect to personal holding companies.

(a) Effectuation of deficiency dividends by consent dividend proce
dure should be authorized.

Often the finances of the corporation at the time of determina
tion of a personal holding company tax deficiency are such that the
payment of a cash dividend to take up the prior deficiency is not
possible without seriously disturbing the corporation’s financial
status. Such a cash deficiency dividend is utterly impossible where
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the corporation has previously been liquidated. This can be reme
died by amending the statute to permit the application of the con
sent dividend provisions to deficiency dividends.
(b) Deficiency dividend procedure should not be denied in cases of
non-fraudulent delinquency in filing personal holding company
tax returns.

The provisions of Section 506(f) denying the benefit of the
deficiency dividend credit if the final determination of deficiency
contains a finding that any part of the deficiency is due to fraud
with intent to evade tax, or failure to file the return within the
proper time, unless it is shown that such failure is due to reasonable
cause and not to willful neglect, should be modified and confined
to fraud cases. In many cases personal holding company tax re
turns have, inadvertently and innocently, not been filed, either be
cause of ignorance, or because of failure to recognize the effect of
certain technical provisions, or because of changes in administra
tive or judicial interpretation of the provisions defining personal
holding companies. In some cases changes made by Internal Rev
enue Agents have caused taxpayers to fall within the personal
holding company classifications when clearly, prior to such
changes, the filing of personal holding company returns would not
have been required. In many such cases, the Commissioner of In
ternal Revenue has been sustained in his claim that the taxpayer
has not shown that the failure to file the return on time was due
to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect, including cases
where the fault, if any, lay with the taxpayer’s adviser and not
with the taxpayer.
Because the cases involving delinquency penalties as a general
rule are not serious and involve no element of fraud, the further
penalty of a denial of the right to the deficiency dividend credit
is unjust. The aggregate penalties might well exceed the fraud
penalty in the case of an ordinary corporation. Hence, it is urged
that the provisions of Section 506(f) be limited to cases in which
all or part of the deficiency is due to fraud with intent to evade tax.
(c) The deduction of the federal income tax, in computing undis
tributed subchapter A net income, should be clearly stated to be
the tax for the taxable year, whether the corporation is on the
cash basis or the accrual basis.

Under present law the deduction allowed for federal income
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tax, in computing undistributed subchapter A net income, is the
tax paid or accrued during the taxable year, depending on the tax
payer’s method of accounting. In the case of a cash basis corpora
tion the deduction is for any such taxes actually paid during the
taxable year, generally consisting of the tax for the immediately
preceding year and/or any deficiencies paid for still earlier years.
In the case of such a cash basis corporation, which is either newly
formed, or which had no income tax for the preceding year, the
total tax can and frequently does exceed 100 per cent: e.g., on a
$100,000 net income (undistributed), to a cash basis taxpayer the
income tax would be $38,000 and the personal holding company tax
$84,800, or a total of $122,800.
21. The present double taxation of corporate income—once to the earning
corporation, and again to the stockholders upon distribution of such
income as dividends—should be mitigated and eventually eliminated.
This double taxation has two aspects: (a) tax on intercorporate divi
dends and (b) tax on dividends paid to non-corporate shareholders with
out credit either to the corporation or to the shareholder. The tax on
intercorporate dividends should be eliminated. Non-corporate share
holders should be allowed a credit against individual income tax of a
percentage of dividend income equal to the initial combined rate of
normal tax and surtax on individuals, such credit not to exceed the tax,
otherwise determined, after applying the credits provided in Sections 31
and 32 but before applying the credit provided in Section 35 of the
Internal Revenue Code.

At present, corporate income is subject to a double burden of
tax as compared with all other types of income and particularly
as compared with business income derived in unincorporated form,
such as single proprietorships and partnerships. The duplicate
taxation becomes multiple taxation where intercorporate stock
holdings and parent-subsidiary corporations are involved, since
the corporate income, while passing from the original earning cor
poration to the ultimate non-corporate stockholders, is subject to
tax in the hands of each intermediate corporation in the chain of
stock ownership. In addition to the resulting tax inequities, this
condition has exerted a disproportionately powerful influence on
the selection between corporate and other forms of doing business,
has led to unbalanced and unsound financial structures through the
substitution of borrowings—the interest payments on which are
deductible—for capital stock issues—the dividend payments on
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which are not deductible—, and has either discouraged, or im
posed a tax penalty on—economically necessary and sound parent
subsidiary structures.
This subject, above all others in the field of tax revision, has
been distinguished by the fact that almost universal agreement
on the desirability of eliminating or mitigating the multiple taxa
tion of corporate income has been at least matched by almost uni
versal disagreement as to the best method of achieving that objec
tive—a disagreement which several years of study and public dis
cussion by many interested groups and individuals have failed to
resolve. This committee recommends allowance of a credit for divi
dends received by non-corporate shareholders as the simplest and
most practicable approach to the problem of double taxation of
corporate dividends. It is recognized that fiscal requirements of
the Government may make impractical, at this time, complete elim
ination of double taxation of dividends. This committee recom
mends allowance of a credit, equal to the lowest bracket tax rate
applicable to individual incomes.
The credit recommended above will be a partial solution to
the inequitable multiple taxation of corporate income distributed
to non-corporate shareholders.
22. The 2 per cent additional tax applicable to consolidated returns should
be eliminated.

There is every justification for taxing an affiliated group of
corporations as the single unit which, economically and in practical
fact, it is. This has been recognized as sound accounting and busi
ness practice for many years. The principle of consolidated income
tax returns is sound because thereby the taxable income of an
affiliated group is more clearly reflected than by separate return
filing. If it is sound to determine the taxable income of an affili
ated group on a consolidated basis, filing on that basis should not
be penalized. If such filing is desirable, it should not be dis
couraged. Determination of taxable income on the basis of the
actual business entity—as distinguished from the artificial sep
arate corporate entities—should not be regarded as a privilege to
be paid for, but as a desirable objective to be encouraged, or, at
least, not discouraged.
23. The “notch” provision under which corporate income between $25,000.00
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and $50,000.00 is taxed at 53 per cent as compared with the 38 per cent
applicable to income in excess of $50,000.00, should be eliminated, and
all corporate incomes, regardless of size, taxed on a graduated rate scale
up to $50,000.00, and at a flat rate thereafter, the rate applicable to any
income bracket to be no greater than the flat rate.

Under the prevailing rate structure, corporations earning up
to $25,000.00 a year pay from 21 to 25 per cent, thereafter 53 per
cent on the next $25,000.00, and 38 per cent on the balance of the
income. The purpose of the 53 per cent rate in the so-called
“notch” bracket (from $25,000.00 to $50,000.00) is to produce an
effective rate, equivalent to a flat 38 per cent on the entire income,
for incomes exceeding $50,000.00.
The much higher rate for this segment of income is not only
unfair but promotes corporate divisions and split-ups and con
tributes to distortions of income. A method of gradual transition
from the lower to the higher rates, comparable to the individual
surtax tables, will overcome these conditions.
24. Where a corporation is formed or availed of to acquire the assets and
become the successor, in a tax-free reorganization, of a predecessor cor
poration, which, in pursuance of the plan, is liquidated and dissolved,
the successor corporation should step into the “tax shoes” of the pred
ecessor corporation for the purpose of permitting carry-back and carry
forward of net operating losses from one to the other, and application
of the tax benefit rule to recoveries by the successor on losses or deduc
tions previously claimed or allowable to the predecessor, and so as to
permit full deductibility by the successor of any payments or charges
which would have been deductible by the predecessor had the pred
ecessor continued in existence.

Under Sections 112 and 113 of the Code, property acquired by
a corporation in certain types of corporate reorganization has the
same basis for tax purposes as in the hands of the predecessor
company. The underlying theory is that the successor steps into
the “tax shoes” of the predecessor company. This theory, how
ever, has not been extended beyond the basis of property except
with respect to the status of life insurance as provided in Section
110 of the Revenue Act of 1942. Thus, the Commissioner has not
conceded that net operating losses of the predecessor can be car
ried forward against income of the successor, or vice-versa. In
terest paid on additional taxes asserted against the predecessor can
be deducted by the successor only to the extent accrued since the
date of the reorganization, except possibly in the case of statutory
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mergers or consolidations. The tax benefit rules provided in Sec
tions 22(b) (12) and 127 of the Code with respect to recoveries on
bad debts or taxes or losses or other items previously claimed or
allowable to the predecessor is not extended to the successor. Other
items of expenses paid by the successor on account of the pred
ecessor, which would have been deductible by the predecessor had
it continued in existence, are not allowed as deductions to the suc
cessor.
This should be corrected by providing that the successor in
such cases succeeds to the tax status of the predecessor for the
purposes above mentioned.
The principle asserted above should be made applicable to all
transactions recognized as tax free under Section 112 of the In
ternal Revenue Code, including complete liquidations of corpora
tions under subsection 112(b)(6). The corrective amendment
should be made applicable retroactively to all taxable years not
barred by limitation or closing agreement.
25. For the purpose of Section 23(g)(4), which excludes from the capital
loss category, loss from worthlessness of stock in a virtually wholly
owned subsidiary of a domestic corporation, if more than 90 per cent
of the subsidiary’s gross income for its entire history was from other
than investment sources, gross income from the sale of merchandise,
stock in trade, or property held primarily for sale to customers in the
ordinary course of the trade or business, should be defined to mean
“gross receipts” from such sales.

Broadly speaking, it was the purpose of Section 23(g) (4) to
permit an ordinary loss deduction for loss from worthlessness of
stock in a bona fide operating subsidiary, with no substantial in
vestment income. This purpose is defeated where the subsidiary’s
operations are so disastrous that it has a gross loss on its sales, and
therefore no gross income therefrom, since in such case an utterly
insignificant amount of investment income would be more than 10
per cent of the gross income and would remove the case from Sec
tion 23(g)(4), requiring treatment of the loss as a capital loss.
This should be remedied by defining gross income from sales, for
this purpose, as “gross receipts” from sales. This amendment
should be made applicable retroactively to all open years.
26. A transfer of substantially all the assets of a corporation to another
corporation should not be disqualified as a “reorganization” under Sec
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tion 112(g)(1)(C) merely because the voting stock received in exchange
is that of a parent company of the transferee corporation.

In Groman v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 82 and Helvering v. Bash
ford, 302 U.S. 454, the Supreme Court held that where all the assets
of one corporation were transferred to another company for its
stock, and such properties were then transferred to a subsidiary
of the company issuing the stock (or were transferred directly to
such subsidiary in the first instance), the company issuing the
stock was not a “party to the reorganization” and the receipt of
its stock by the shareholders of the company whose properties
were acquired was a taxable exchange—and not, as in most mergers,
an exchange on which gain or loss is not recognized. Such transfers
should qualify as tax-free reorganizations to the same extent as
if the stock-issuing company had no subsidiary and retained the
properties itself—the transfer to such subsidiary being purely an
internal arrangement of the stock-issuing company. This condi
tion can be remedied by extending the term “party to a reorgani
zation” to include the parent corporation owning all of the stock
of a corporation to which the properties are transferred.
27. The definition of reorganization in Section 112(g) should be broadened
to bring within its scope “spin-off” and “split-up” transfers.

The definition of reorganization should be amended to permit
the distribution, pursuant to a plan of reorganization, to a share
holder of a corporation a party to the reorganization, of stock in
such corporation or in another corporation a party to the reorgani
zation without surrender by the shareholder of stock in the dis
tributing corporation. Enactment of this change will facilitate
corporate readjustments by removing the present requirement that
stock in the distributing corporation be surrendered in the course
of such a reorganization.
The definition of a reorganization in Section 112(g) should be
clarified to remove any doubt that an exchange, pursuant to a
plan of reorganization, of shares in a corporation by its share
holders for stock of two or more corporations formed to acquire
the assets of such corporation is a reorganization.
28. Recommendations re mitigation of effect of statute of limitations.

The purpose of Section 3801 was to mitigate the effect of the
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statute of limitations since “It was never intended that the statute
of limitations should have the result of allowing either taxpayer or
Commissioner to reap a double advantage from its operation by
assuming in one year a position inconsistent with that taken in a
barred year. ”
Section 3801, as enacted, has limited application since (1) only
income and profits taxes under Chapter 1 and subchapters A, B,
D and E of Chapter 2 may be involved, (2) the error and the de
termination, as defined by Section 3801(a), must relate to the
same type of tax as enumerated in (1) above; (3) the determina
tion and error must relate to the situations specified in Section
3801(b). These limitations restrict the benefits to be derived from
this Section and do not relieve the hardship in many meritorious
situations, those falling outside these specific types of cases con
tinuing to rest on general principles. For example, if the Commis
sioner shifts an item of income from a barred year to an open year,
or a deduction from an open year to a barred year, the taxpayer
in equity and good conscience should be entitled to a refund for the
barred year. The Commissioner at present has no power to grant
the refund. Another class of situation involves an adjustment for
one taxpayer because of another taxpayer’s error.
The law should be amended to cover the following:

(1) When a deduction is made in good faith on the tax return
of one year and is disallowed by the Commissioner on the ground
that it was deductible in a return of a different year.
(2) When income is included by the taxpayer in good faith in
one year and is held by the Commissioner to be taxable in another
year.
(3) When the basis of an asset claimed by taxpayer is reduced
by the Commissioner for the purpose of computing net income of
one year on the ground that the reduction of the basis should have
been made in another year.
(4) When income or deductions are included or deducted by
one member of an affiliated group, as defined in Section 141(d),
and are allocated by the Commissioner to another member of the
group.
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(5) When income or deductions are included in good faith in
the tax return of one taxpayer but are adjusted by the Commis
sioner because of another taxpayer’s error.
(6) When income or deductions are included in good faith on
the tax return of one taxpayer and adjustments are made by the
Commissioner in respect to a related taxpayer under the provi
sions of Section 45.

